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Controlling Malaria and Men: 
Rockefeller Health Intervention in "Porto Rico", 1920-1926 
This projed intended to explore the historical origins of asymmetrical 
development of colonized countries through a focus on health status and relatedly, 
the public health structure. The clear presence and imposition of the US and its 
health system, and the extent and depth to which it affects and intervenes in the 
daily lives of the colonized, is particularly telling; yet, public health is a 
phenomenon hidden from public and academic scrutiny. This project attempts to 
explore coopaation among corporations and government as cuconspirators in the 
development of a public health system in colonized countries, and the different 
development experienced as a result of colonization. Its parhcular emphasis is on 
the role of foundations, which I had origmally con- as passive observes. 
Instead, the Rockefeller Foundation in particular was a powerful player controlling 
or benefiting from both sets of interests. 
The study of health and organizational involvement h public health 
development has always presented the image of an altruistic and charitable gesture 
towards disadvantaged populations, perhaps a measure of governments 
commitment to its citizens. The issue became even more interesting to consider in 
,the context of colonialism, where definite and material power imbalances have life 
and death consequences. Puerto Rico, still an unincorporated territory of the US, 
presented a wonderful case to consider these relationships, parhcularly in the early 
period of US occupation and intervention in it, 1898- 1926. 
Despite the fad that I had limited access to government data which curtailed 
my investigation of the years from 1898-1920, the RF data illuminated a l l  three 
organizations role within the development of public health in Puerto Rico. The role 
of the Rockefeller Foundation also suggests the relationships between colonization 
and health status. It seemed likely that health should be affected by 
underdevelopment, the result of colonization. I also explored how the construction 
of health and disease played a role in the legitimating the presence of the colonizing 
country. 
Interestingly, historians writing on Puerto Rico often note health as the only 
arena in which improvements were made to living standards during this period. 
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This project attempted to deal with two possible outcomes. First, that health might 
improve in the interests of preserving and maintaining the colonial ~nfluence 
through the acquisition of some measure of public favor. Second, that health might 
worsen as a result of underdevelopment and the colonial presence. The findings of 
this study show that parts of both were true in the case of Puato Rico. 
While health may have improved to some extent in regards to particular 
diseases, the occurrence of epidemics increased. Further, there is some preliminary 
evidence to show that health played a role in stabilizing the colonial administration. 
It also seems clear that the changes in export crops and increasing capitalist 
produdion created new health problems for some populations, largely men of color 
working in the coastal areas in sugar plantations, as well as the poor increasingly 
migrating into urban or semi-rural areas. Finally, this study shows that health 
initiatives were inextricably enmeshed with the goals of US capitalists invested in 
maintaining a work force. 
Method 
In trying to understand the relationship between politics and health, it 
initially seemed obvious to begin looking at the initiatives and work of various 
departments of US government. Two issues emerged, however, which shifted my 
attention from the government. First, and perhaps most importantly, a shortage of 
funds and time limited my work at the National Archives. Second, I came to 
understand that in what has been called the formative period of American medicine, 
foundations were the major influence on its direction and development.' 
There were two initiatives that the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) was 
engaged in at this time in Puato Rico (PR). The first began earlier and related to 
uncinariasis, anemia, and hookworm all diseases related to each other. Their first 
site was in Utuado, on a sugar and coffee plantation, where the government would 
then locate the Institute for Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. The majority of RF's 
activities, however, occur after 1920. I chose to focus on their second initiative, 
malaria. 
' see Duffy, John. 1993. From Humors to Medical Scihce; A History of American Medicine. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Ress. Also, Brown, Richard. 1960. Roc~e l ler  Medicine Men; 
Medicine & Capitalism in America. Berkeley: University of California Ress. 
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I used a l l  data the RF had on its activities regarding malaria in PR at this 
time. Included are project reports, correspondence, the International Health Board 
 record^,^ IHB reports, and reports on malaria. Missing from this study are some 
overlapping data from the hookworm initiative, and other political debates and 
events which arose during this time which, while not directly related to malaria, 
illuminates the positions RF took. 
This project was a preliminary analysis of a subset of the data I collected at 
RF. As a result, it does not rely heavily on secondary analysis nor does it 
significantly respond to it. Instead, it tries to unravel the story the documents tell. 
This decision was conscious, as there is no data on the history public health in PR 
during this period. I therefore felt it necessary to attempt to read the documents 
with as little attempt to superimpose a theoretical explanation as possible. 
. Obviously, however, my papective was influenced by my readings and training 
and although I have tried to limit its affect, I may not have been as successful as I 
had hoped. 
Historical Context 
Public Health efforts can be said to have begun in Puerto Rim on June 29, 
1899, six months after the Treaty of Paris in which it was ceded to the United 
States was signed, with the establishment of the board of health. Its earliest project 
was to deal with the 'smallpox scare', a g e n d  vaccination which had reached 
epidemic (50 cases3) proportion by the standards of the early 20th century. Before 
1910, the direction of public health work would shift4 repeatedly to different 
The International Health Division, later Board worked closely in conjunction with the Rockefeller 
Foundation. They merged in 1927 and RF acquired all their documents. I have treated them as the 
same entity in this project, because there was no data to suggest that there was any distinction in 
the minds of doctors or officials, and there is no evidence that any actions or ideas were ever in 
conflict. 
Davison, L.P. 1899. "Report on the Sanitary Conditions of Ponce", Public Health Reports. 
14:Apd 21, pp.42. 
As most of my data depended on the Commissioner of Health (Ruiz-Soler) activities, I ignored 
whether this was truly a shift or transferrence of responsibility or not. If it wasn't, there may have 
been much more PH work going on at that time and the lack of organizational cooperation would 
be another phenomenon to investigate in future research. 
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organizations; the ofice of the Governor, the Superior Board of Health, the 
Department of Interior, the Health, Charities and Correction Department and late 
the Labor, Charities, and Correction Department, thesanitation Service, etc. Even 
from its early beginnings, however, the data suggests that different forms of public 
opinion resisted public health initiativess. 
Evidence of economic and political interests abounds throughout the 
collected data. First, it seems apparent that the location of these initiatives were on 
or near'sugar plantations. For instance, the site selected for the I'I'MH was 1 mile 
from Utuado, at the coffee and sugar plantation known as San Andres. This was 
also where the RF located its uncinariasis campaign, and where the earliest anemia 
commission of the government (1904, 1905) had inaugurated its campaign. 
The second phenomenon evidencing political and economic interests lie in 
the of development, in this case not only directly in terms of the expatation 
of profits, but also indirectly through scientific and technological development, with 
all the political and economic rewards it offered the US. For example, even as early 
as 19 1 3, the Institute of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene worked in conjundion with 
the Surgeon ~eneral 'of the Army to study "tropical diseases as they exist in Porto 
R i ~ o " . ~  This emphasis on research at the expense of service is a trend shared by a l l  
interests, with the exception of a handful of government7 initiatives. Their building 
was originally slated to serve as a quarantine hospital, but was instead turned over 
to the institute by the director of sanitation. Research on sprue/hookworm8 was one 
of the prime objects of the institute. Municipal physicians seldom made visits to the 
sick poor in the country. 
More excavation needs to be done in this area. It is only hinted at in official reports in the early 
years of US involvement in PR, and later often overlaps with labor movement struggles. 
quoted in Public Health Reports, vol XXVIII:50, pg.2681, Dec. 12, 1913. 
' Government only; any collaborations with other org+izations meant a severe curtailment of any 
service. The service offered in collaborations was not only limited, but also depended on the 
indvidual as a research subject whose other maladies had to be controlled in order to continue 
research. 
Patients bring a specimen of feces to the clinic. King reported on this saying, that they were 
most commonly brought & safety match boxes and the "cajita" has become synonomous with the 
fecal specimen. , 
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As mentioned earlier in this paper, I was particularly interested in my 
original proposal, with the idea so prevalent among historians that health status and 
the health care system improved under US administration of Puerto Rico. This 
information is used here to contextualize the malaria initiative. Data from Public 
Health Reports, the journal of the Marine Hospital Service: illuminate health status 
trends. Briefly summarized in table 1.1 are the trends for selected diseases, for 
selected I chose Ponce and January in the interests of consistency of data, its ' 
proximity to other health initiatives1'. 
From the beginning, the US peaceived many diseases to be on epidemic 
levels in Puerto Rico. In fad, there were special reports on' particular diseases 
e v q  year. An 1899 general report on Ponce found typhoid and venereal diseases 
to be common, and TB to be the primary killer." In the early 1900's, there were 
supposed epidemics of smallpox, influenza, yellow fever, 'etc. In 1910, it was 
hookworm. In 1918, the influenza epidemic. In fad, epidemics and death were 
indeed the byproducts of US involvement in PR. In the case of malaria, for 
instance, which RF doctors thought was in epidemic levels, sugar plantations 
increased the incidence of and conditions necessary for malaria. 
see Mullan, Fitzhugh. 1989. Plagues and Politics: lhe Story of the United States Public Health 
Service. New.York: Basic Books, Inc. for general overview of development of US Public Health 
System. 
lo Ideally, I would have used annual reports to control for any prevalence of health problems for 
January. I had difficulty finding annual reports, and probably wdl have to compile my owe. 
I '  Davison, L.P. 1899. "Report on the'sanitary Conditions of Ponce", Public Health Reports. 
14:April 21, pp.42. 
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Consistenlly the largest single category, includes Gastro-Enteritis, Enteritis, Gastritis, and Entem-colitia 
Table 1.1. 
Vital Statistics1* for selected diseases in ponce13 for the Month of January, 1902-1907 
The above table (1.1) shows the severity and extent of digestive diseases 
and TB, yet the establishment of a TI3 hospital to serve the poor did not occur until 
1918. Before that time, the majority of government efforts to deal with the "white 
plaguen consisted of legislation to monitor its extent, and the lives of those who had 
been affected by it. As early as 1899, the Board of Health resolved to disinfect 
houses that had been occupied by a perion sick with TB, that their effects be 







and the newspaper." In the same week they had found isolation impractical due to 
This data was taken from the Public Health Reports. It ranges fiom weekly reports, to monthly 
reports, with the months after1908 difficult to find. 
l 3  I have focused on Ponce only for the purposes of illustration. Ponce and San Juan are the only 
two cities for which I have consistent morbidity and mortality data before 1910, and they seem to 
follow the same trend, with Ponce consistently showing higher numbers of cases for the same 
diseases (see Map 1. I). I also focused on Ponce because, as opposed to San Juan, I could obtain 
figures for Respiratory and Nervous dseases. 
t 
I Po nce 
l4 The figures for Malaria are slightly higher in the summer months, in some years approaching 
the number of cases of TB, although this is not generally the case. 







l6 To compare the extent of the problem of these diseases and their severity, 55 cases of bubbnic 
plague'in Puerto Rico in 1913 were enough to classify it as a epidemic. This classification was 











l7 Davison, L.P. 1899. "Report on the Sanitary Conditions of Ponce", Public Health Reports. 
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the widespread nature of the disease1' and proposed a city "pesthouse" for the 
isolation of these cases because it would be cheaper than their "removal" to the 
quarantine station.19 
Table 1.1 also shows the death rate did not decrease but rather remained 
relatively steady around t h e ' 1 9 1 0 ' ~ . ~ ~  It in fact increased in most towns after this. 
Table 1.2 shows the mortality rates for all submunicipalities for the years 1910 to 
1920. They show that whereas most towns experience an increase in mortality, 
those in which RF had done demonstration projects had decreased their death rates 
before RF even appeared there. These tables prove that not only were initiatives for 
malaria not located in the areas with highest mortality, but they were not focused on 
the most pressing diseases causing this mortality, particularly digestive diseases. 
In serving patients, the lTMH really did not do other kinds of tests or 
medical care, but King's report on December 12, 1913 notes that of special cases, 
he treated 44 of pulmonary TB, and in comparison only 5 of malaria. It seems clear 
then, not only through reports which may not have been accessible to doctors but 
were to policymakers, but also through practice that doctors were aware of the 
severity of TB in comparison to'malaria. In 1913, malaria had only appeared in two 
municipalities, and the public health reports classifies its extent as limited. The 
question naturally arises then.. . 
Why would the government, corporations, and RF give so much attention 
to malaria? What does it mean that public health officials and the Rockefeller 
-- - - - - -- 
I S  Sanders, W. H. 1899. Public Health Reports. vol. XIV:6 (Feb. lo), pp. 179- 183. 
l9 Glennan, A.H. 1899. Public Health Reports. vol. XIV:6 (Feb. lo), pp. 1854. G l e ~ a n  was 
a surgeon for the US Marine Hospital Service. 
20 Unlike in other colonial administrations, no where in the'data, either before or after 1910, is it 
suggested that patients were afraid of or untrusting of the doctors. In fact, Dr. Earle in 1924 
specifically notes that people patronize the clinics. RF RG5 S1.2 B 185 F2391. The problem lie 
ii~ the lack of medical attention for "50 to 70 per cent" of the population. There few doctors, 
and those that exist are very poorly paid, they seldom visit rural areas, and there are few hospitals 
throu&out PR. By necessity, "Under these circumstances it results that the greater part of the 
rural population rely upon home remedies or .upon the ministrations of some person in the 
neighborhood who has acquired a reputation for treating the sick." King, W.W. 1913. "Public 
Health Work in Porto Rico; A Report Of The Work Of The Institute Of Tropical Mdcine And 
Hygene Of Porto Rico", Public Health Reports. Vo1.18:50, December 12. pp.2683. 
INFORhIE DEL CO3IISIONADO DE SANIDAD DE P. R.. I 
r n c ~ ~ a ~ ~  ~g i?&~6-5  i 
Estado demostrativo de la mortalidad en uerto Rico comparada por pueblos. 
Tanto por mil sobre la poblacidn. I I 
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Foundation had access to and knowledge of this data? What do their actions tell us 
about their motivations in PR? 
The stated goals of the Sanitary Department were "to decrease mortality, 
increase natality, and to obtain greatest longevity within the limits fixed by nature 
on human existence, a trilogy, which resting on nuptiality and on sound fecundity, 
constitutes the characteristics of modern sanitary sciencen2' This statement reflects 
the contradictions not only between the health status at that time and the initiatives 
that did not service the largest problems, but would also being contradicted by the 
earliest attempts at fertility control of Puerto Rican women.22 
It should not surprising that public health officials even took note that the 
death rate was increasing. Dr. King of the US Marine Health Service not only 
noted that the death rate was increasing, but also suggested an explanation for it. 
He writes, 
'The general death rate is increasing, principally from diseases of 
the digestive apparatus, one of the principal causes being lack of 
proper food. The great staples, as flour, potatoes, rice, beans, 
meal, and dried fish, which constitute the principal articles, are 
imported duty free by a few houses having a monopoly, and are 
raising the prices beyond the reach of the lower classes who then 
must resort to inferior food. This monopoly is protected by a 
prohibitive tax. This lack of their accustomed food I think is the 
principal cause of the deaths, though other causes are at work.n23 
The food supply was at the mercy of politicueconomic developments 
occurring at this time, particularly those concerning tariffs where high tariffs' on 
goods exchanged between PR and the US and no tariff relief made the purchase of 
adequate food impossible for most. This situation is exaceabated by the Foraker Act 
Public Health Reports, Report of the Commissioner of Health of Porto Rico, 1919. From the 
Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1919, pgs. 127-232. 
'' This is much in evidence in the work of Lopez, Iris. 1993. "Agency and Constraint: 
Sterilization and Reproductive Freedom among Puerto Rican Women in New York City", Udwz 
Anthropology and Studies of Cultuml Systems and World Economic Development. 22: 
FallJWinter, p. 299-323; and Laura Briggs, dissertation in progress. Also worthy of note is the 
film, La @emcion. 
'' King, W. W. 1900. Public Health Rqpons. vo1.15:30, July 27, p.1912-3: k n g  was an 
Assistant Surgeon in the US Marine Hospital Service. 
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of 1900,24 which among other things, which established that all goods that moved 
between the island and the mainland were to be carried by US shipping lines, which 
were more expensive. The facts that the majority of PR's food was imported, 
incomes were lower in PR, and there was a large loss of money when PR converted 
to the US monetary system, made the acquisition of adequate food25 virtually 
impossible. The structure is thus set by the Foraker A d  for the success of US 
business, at the expense of the lives of -Puerto Ricans. 
Even the reports (Caroll, Sherman, Hanna) that were ordered by Congress 
after the Foraker A d  furthered the projed of capitalist expansion. Although 
Congress did see fit to implement many of the recommendations made in these 
reports for improved health care, these acts had another aspect that was inextricably 
tied to the maintenance and usefulness of Puerto Rico's colonial status. ''American 
business entrepreneurs and administrators could come to Puerto Rico to produce 
and sell goods without fearing disease and with the assurance of finding a 
reasonably health and minimally educated population to labor in the cane fields and 
the f a~ to r i e s . "~~  
The Foraker A d  also set the terms of the civilian government; which would 
affect the direction in which social policy and ideology would guide the 
development of a public health system. It provided for rule by US civilians 
appointed by War Department and the president and approved by Congress. The 
Governor would be presidentially appointed, and until 1946, all appointees were 
North Americans. These officials had the power to name other government 
officials. Die& writes that this political configuration "influenced the direction of 
24 In future research, I will have to investigate the 1917 Jones Act's possible repercussions 
onhealth, as well as other political and legislative developments. 
25 Dr. King, Assistant Surgeon in the Marine Hospital Service writes the death rate increases 
as a result of diseases of the digestive apparatus, "one of the pnncipal causes being lack of proper 
food. The great staples, as flour, potatoes, rice, beans, meal. and dried fish, which constitute the 
pnncipal articles, are imported duty free by a few houses having a monopoly, and are raising the 
prices beyond the reach of the lower classes who then must resort to inferior food. Thls monopoly 
is protected by a prohibitive tax. This lack of their accostomed food I think is the pnncipal cause 
of deaths, though other causes are at work." King, W.W. 1900. Public Haalth Reports. 
vo1.15:30, July 27. pp. 1912-3. 
26 Dietz, James L. 1986. Economic History of Puerto Rico; Institutional Change and Capitalist 
Development. Prmceton: Rinceton University Press, p.93. 
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socioeconomic development and ideological training" (p.87) So, we can deduce 
that many of the social services 'provided' by the US were in line with this vision 
and ethos. This legal and political configuration of power no doubt delimited the 
form that health initiatives would take, which of them would be funded, etc. This 
structure also illuminates the underlying ideology reflecting the US attitudes 
towards the life and health of Puerto Ricans. 
The economic crisis aside, disease and epidemics would also be created by 
the specific forms US capital development would take Not only were these 
initiatives intent on maintaining a labor force, but they also created the very 
conditions they had focused on. The increase in production, as well as the 
conversation of the Puerto Rican economy from a coffee and sugar export economy 
to a sugw monoculture in the late 1900's, created many specific health problems for 
laborers working with and near. coffee and later sugar plantations. In many- ways, 
Puerto Ricans paid the price of 'development' with their lives. - 
The role of the national bourgeoisie remains complicated to me at the writing 
of this paper. Medicine may have been the only profession that conferred some 
status to the elite of Puerto Rim, for having no formal administrative political 
- power, the legal profession offered no real opportunities. A 1902 legislative act 
provided for the appointment of a director of health, this.appointee and his 
successors being Puerto @can physicians. On one hand, this act or the vehy 
existence of the department may have been an attempt to pacify .the elite.27 On the 
other, it suggests ways in which that same elite class cooperated in US political and 
corporate exploitation of the island. The direction and character the public health 
system would take was not in the interests of the majority of Puerto Ricans, as the 
neglect of many diseases that resulted from poverty would show. 
THE ROCKEFELLER DATA 
As can be shown fkom the. above table, neither malaria nor 
anernialuncinariasid ho~kworm,~ '  which the RF chose to focus on, represented as 
- - -  - 
27 The data to be presented on malaria supports this as the reality for Puerto kcan doctors who 
were suffered the consequences of RF opinions of them. 
28 Of these, anemia seems the more important. An RF official writes "the control of soil 
pollution is by @r the most important of all health problems throughout the whole of the tropical 
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sigruficant a problem in PR as other diseases, particularly digestive diseases and 
TB. An attempt to serve an altruistic aim of serving public health in general then 
was not present inthis period. What's more, TE3 initiatives by RF did not begin 
until 1930, although it is omnipresent in government reports of the health situation 
in PR. The question of expressed goals of the RF, 'The Welfare of Mankind 
Throughout the ~ o r l d " ~ ~  are contradicted by the initiatives that were supported. In 
this paper, 1-will explore motivations for focusing on one of'the RF's two initiatives 
during this period: uncinariasis, which malaria. 
Mas from the RF officials suggest that health improvement would result 
in a more cornFtive colony, and was therefore part of the process of 
development. For example, in a 1920 letter from Victor Heiser he states that 
regardless of the extent of RF support and involvement in PR, 'St seems to me 
imperative that the health conditions in Porto Rico be improved if that island is 
successfully to compete with its  neighbor^."^' What is most telling, however, is 
that he sees this comwtion resulting from a strong labor force. His following 
sentence states that "A laboring force so thoroughly depleted in physical strength 
can scarcely be expected to hold its own. "3 
His statement shows that the goals of maintaining a strong labor force and 
capitalist development, at least for the US, were inextricable. What's more, he 
feels that a strong labor force will make PR competitive, while we know that the 
majority of profits derived from the exports the laborers worked on went directly to 
US corporations and their shareholders. What's more, we know that development 
depends on undevelopment (Frank, Navarro) which includes the arena of health. 
While part of this development/undeadevelopment follows the traditional models 
~ - 
and subtropical regions of the world, except possibly in limited sections where malaria 
overshadows the soil pollution diseases." RF RGS S 1.2 B 185 F239 1. l h s  initiative began 
earlier, lasted longer, and had a much more complex organization which included sharing doctors 
during epidemics, affiliations with Governor Roosevelt, etc. My lack of knowledge about the 
coffee industry, which this initiative involved as well as sugar, discouraged me fiom exploring that 
data at this time. 
*' in RF charter. 
'O letter from Victor Heiser to John Turner; 2/13/1920. RF RG5 S1.2 B92 F1284 
" Ibid. 
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outlined by dependency theorists, another part of development was in scientific 
advances made at the expense of lives of Puerto Ricans. 
The relationship between the development of sugar interests in the island, or 
capitalist expansion in PR, was not unidirectional. The desires of large US sugar 
corporations to maintain a labor force, and the goals of the Rockefeller Foundation 
to expand capitalism and its ideology were only part of the incentive for the RF for 
public health intervention in PR. The betterment of health status in PR was 
especially desirous because in itself, 'it drectly improved productivity. 
Reciprocally, the increasing exportation and rising prices of sugar played a central 
role in making these health initiatives attractive to RF. 
For the RF that would guide the government agenda for Puerto Rican 
health, the prices of sugar directly affected what initiatives the RF thought would be 
feasible. For example, in considering extending malaria control to Barceloneta in 
1924, the lead physician says "Central appears to be making money at the present 
time and I believe it is interested in doing something.n32 The RF expected that all its 
initiatives would be taken over eventually by either these corporations or the 
government.33 Health is then both symptom and cause of development, 
productivity, and politics. Later in the same letter, Earle relates that "Sugar cane is 
good so far this year for rain has come at a good time, the price seems to be going 
up a little, and the Unionist party has won the elections over the whole island so 
that there ought to be plenty of money next year."34 
Brown's discussion of the RF shows us how government and foundation 
policy were linked, and succeeded because they served the interests of the corporate 
classes. He argues that foundation programs were "intended to develop and 
strengthen institutions that would extend the reach and tighten the grasp of 
capitalism throughout society."35 In the case of colonialism, however, this 
3' letter from Dr. Earle to Dr. Howard, Nov. 1 1, 1924. RF RG5 S 1.2 B 185 F239 1.  
33 Before this, Earle says "Plmela could be persuaded to assume most of the cost, depending 
somewhat on the crop and on the price of sugar." bid. The sugar central at Barceloneta is 
Plazuela Central. 
34 Ibid. 
3-' Brown pg.9. 
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development also occurs through discourses on race, the tropics, civilization, and 
Americanization. The goal was to Americanize and assimilate Puerto Ricans, after 
all, and prevent its independence which challenged both political and economic 
interests. 
The growth of health services in Puerto Rico was stimulated the desire to 
'bring civilization', i.e. the fruits of modern sanitation, to Puerto Rico. The goals 
of modernization and Americanization represent not only a discourse akin to 
'manifest destiny' and the 'white man's burden', it also represented a way to justify 
capital expansion in the traditional form of colonialism. The 'tropical other' is 
constructed through a discourse on b i d t u r a l  vulnerability, leaving the political, 
psychic, economic, and physical landscape of Puerto Rim and Puerto Ricans open 
for exploitation, and once internalized, lessens the threat of large scale popular 
movements towards independence. The latent goal is to control and assimilate. 
Colonial discourse in other countries has constructed the colonized body as 
duty. This has served the purpose of ideologically justifying intervention, i.e. to 
civilize, control [epidemics and bodies36]. This project is further complicated by 
constructions of the subject population as lacking in civil spirit, and therefore 
unworthy of citizenship without the 'progress' in teaching Puerto Ricans the values 
and benefits of sanitation, hygiene, and cleanliness [which parallels the way 
America constructs itself'J. A representative example of 'American's' perception of 
Puerto Rico is worth quoting at length: 
"We met a large number of people, some influential citizens, the may who 
was that day in office (they change it seems every week or so there) and had 
lunch at the Rotary Club where I gave a short talk. All in all Ponce was a 
. rather discouraging sight for me. They have a beautiful Casino and Country 
Club but the dirtiest and roughest streets in the island. We met some of the 
apparently most intelligent people in Porto Rico but no one seems to be all 
worked up over things,-even typhoid fever-except to try and place the 
blame. I was surprised that they put up with such things and I told some of 
them so. Apparently on each question they line up on both sides and do not 
get anything done or else all is left to politicians who waste all the money. 
Certainly Ponce will not get anywhere on its own initiative.*37 
36 The early part of the eugenics movement. worldwide should find a place in h s  study, which I 
would like to consider in future research. 
37 letter from Dr. Earle to Howard, Oct. 15, 1924. RF RG5 S1.2 B 185 F2391. 
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A discourse on filth and sanitation is accompanied with complementing 
discourses of modernization, and in the Puerto Rican case, Americanization. The 
paternalistic attitude omnipresent and ubiquitous to date builds upon and reproduces 
a discourse that Puerto Ricans cannot govern themselves, their health, their bodies, 
and therefore much less their own country. The Puerto Rican is construded as 
everywhere constructed as ignorant of their own situation which the US has insight 
into, and trivial in 'personalizing' politics or wasting money, or changing leaders 
daily, etc. This constructed bio-cultural vulnerability necessitates US control, 
surveillance, and order. That Americanization was a clearly defined goal of the 
health service from the inception of US involvement is clear as early as 1899, when 
Captain Davison of the Fifth Infantry states in his report that "Our great Republic 
can not afford to retard the introduction of Western civilization ten or fifteen years 
by too close a hand at the purse strings. Good sanitation is the sign visible of this 
~ivilization."~~ 
~ u c h  like the Major General Brooke's order. that the name of Puerto Rico 
be changed to "Porto Ricon; an action James Dietz calls "an Americanized 
corruption of Spanishn, so were the bodies of Porto Ricans corrupted in the drive to 
'Americanize the natives'. Much in evidence are the stereotypes of difference, 
racial impurity, lack of civil spirit, and general unfitness 'for home 
rule/independence. The documents are rife with examples of 'the pateanalistic 
patronizing attitudes towards Puerto Ricans as incapable of self government ... for. 
example, Victor Clark, in a report by the Brookings Institution, writes that .the 
Foraker Act was designed to "prevent their political inexperience from provoking 
crises or engaging them in unwise public projectsn. 
The rewards to the Rockefeller Foundation for its involvement with Puerto 
, Rim not only. related to capitalist expansion, but also medical advances. Historians 
of health, and of the American medical profession in particular, have well 
documented its problems of authority and viability during this period. During this 
period, the American medical profession had another goal: to prove its worth on a 
global scale and more specifically, to compete with Britain in colonial expansion, 
scientific innovation, and capitalist development. See Briggs. ~ e y o n d  its more 
38 Davidson, L.P. 1899. "Report on Sanitary Conditions in Porto Rico", Public Htnlth Repons. 
vol: l4:May 5 ,  pp.641. Davison was Captain of Fifth Infantry in charge of Sanitation and ex 
officio President San Juan Board of Health. 
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global aspirations, the campaigns for uncinariasis and malaria also had much 
practical relevance to much of the RF's work in the American South at that time. 
For example, the hookworm was discovered in Puerto k c o .  These medical 
advances were made through the use of tests on, at the expense of, Puerto Ricans. 
These scientific explorations with a "subject" population also served to minimize the 
consequences of medical abuses. 
Malaria 
The RF began its demonstration campaign in 1920 in the districts of 
Quebradillas and Guitnica. Gubica was, after all, the largest sugar municipality on 
the island.39 Sugar interests were inextricably linked to malaria for many reasons. 
First, largely rural populations had to be attracted to coastal areas to work on these 
plantations. The development of health care provided an incentive for migrants to 
come to coastal areas.40 Second, sugar plantations increased the numbers of the 
Anopheles mosquito which carried malaria, particularly because they necessitated 
the creation of irrigation ditches where these mosquitoes bred. What's more, 
irrigation kept the soil wet, and when it rained, this water also stagnated. Another 
factor encouraging RF involvement with malaria was that it was understood as a 
"serious complicating factor with hookworm di~ease,"~ '  and therefore involved a 
project they had already committed to. 
They also relied on information about the problems it posed for the Central 
Aguirre Sugar Company's labor force and their offer of financial cooperation in 
making their decision. They surveyed PR before committing any funds, finding the 
area in the heart of the sugar region, which "if control measures on a limited area 
should prove successful, large sugar interests are prepared to supply the funds for 
39 Dietz, 1986. 
Informal conversation with Eduardo ~onilla-~ilva. Also confirmed by a Nov. 28,1924 from 
Earle to Howard in h c h  he says "Very little labor goes to the coast to work in marious regions." 
which must pose a particularly pressing problems for large sugar centrals such as those in . 
Guanica. 
4' From Minutes of the International Health Board, 2/16/1920, on "Porto Rico Malaria s&ey 
Appropriation" RF RG1.l S243I B3 F41. 
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extending the work over the infected region.n42 The project was therefore not only 
a means to collaborate with corporations and have them 'foot' at least part of the 
bill, but also this work was viewed as a means to acquire more power, do work 
"applicable to many other tropical agricultural regionsn43, extend their 
influence/intmention into other regions and countries, and be a central player in 
scientific developments and technology. 
This cooperation proves to be a trend in RF initiatives. RF was not only 
interested in developing capital's interests ,in PR, but also was unwilling to engage 
in projects without the collaboration of either government or corporations, 
preferably of both. This trend also demonstrates that RF was unlikely to take any 
positions or begin any projects that would stand opposed to corporate interests. As 
RF started receiving more requests for assistance, this alliance made the position 
they defended even more insidious and destr~ctive.~~ 
It is also clear the RF saw this as an opportunity to get "experience in 
connection with malaria control in the Intenelated was an exchange of 
technology between Arkansas and PR, and scientific development, where RF 
wanted to test successful control measures in the 'tropical agricultural conditions'. 
These three forces, financial cooperation, scientific advancement, and racial desires 
to explore the 'tropics', al l  played critical roles for the decision to become involved 
with malaria. 
The 1920 RF collaboration with Central Aguirre on malaria control began at 
the RF' s invitation. In a Feb. 1920 letter, Victor Heiser asked for permission to do 
a malaria survey on their plantation, advising th& that they must be prepared to 
finance the operations for malaria control measures.46 In response, Mr. Luce 
" Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
" In 1930 for example, despite national US attention on chlld health and lack of adaquate milk, RF 
not only dismissed the problem, but actively stood in the way of other attempts, iuch as those of 
the American Relief Commission, Chlld Health Fund Incorporated, to intervene in the situation. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Letter from Victor Heiser to Mr. Henley Luce, Resident of Central Aguirre Sugar Co., Feb. 17, 
1920. MB RG5 S 1.2 B 92 F1284. 
I 1 ISLA OE PUERTO 
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responds that he will put it in front of the board and notes in the second paragraph 
of a 2 paragraph letter that "strikes still continue in Porto Rico; and the news which 
I get is not particularly enco~raging."~' Heiser attempts to sell Aguirre by 
responding to this concern, and urges him to take advantage of the benefits of 
modern sanitation as it has "proved of great economic value" in other co~ntries.~' 
Especially present in the minds of both parties then are not only interests of 
improving profits by both increasing production49 or maintaining a labor force, but 
also the protest and mobilization of laborers against them, which malaria control is 
either supposed to compensate for financially, andlor ameliorate the situation 
p~lit ically.~~ 
It seems that part of the RF objectives included making its work a precedent 
for policy. As noted earlier in this paper, foundations provided the support 
necessary for the most tremendous growth American medicine has enjoyed in its 
entire history (1900-1930). The fad that the RF is the only foundation contributing 
to the growth of health services in PR could mean that the goals of RF initiatives 
were the only ones ever institutionalized, and set the stage for later developments in 
PR relative to health concerns. It was already obvious in 1920 that the RF intended 
to involve the government in malaria control, reciprocally taking less responsibility 
over time to make it entirely government led work. 
They say in various different documents that no other course of action, 
beyond collaboration, is safe. The 1920 malaria control demonstration project did 
not follow the same trajectory of government and corporate cooperation with RF 
initiatives. It had secured only corporate interest and involvement, and had 
47 Letter from Luce to Heiser, Feb. 18, 1920. RF RG5 S 1.2 B 92 F 1284. 
48Letter from Heiser to Luce, March 10, 1920. RF RG5 S1.2 B 92 F1284. 
49 The relationship between the cost of health initiatives and sugar cane productivity is also stated 
in Dr. Earle's letter to Howard on November 1 1, 1924. "If mosquito control is not entirely 
successful at the start little will be lost financially because of the increase in productivity of the 
cane lands." RF RG5 S 1.2 B 185 F2391. 
is confirmed in Green (the doctor supervising the project) 1923 report, where he says Aguure's 
inkiest was'stimulated chle to "large economic loss was caused by the great prevalence of malaria 
throughout their estates and desiring to improve the health of their employees." RF RGS S2 B2 1 
F131. 
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. therefore fallen into disfavor with another powerful RF official, Dr. Hector H. 
Howard of the International Health Board, Director of the West InQes. In a memo 
to Heiser, Howard tells hlm that : 
" W e  the need for something to be done in Porto Rico is distressingly 
evident, yet the need for relief and control work does not always 
coincide with favorable opportunity and conditions promising success. 
If it has been necessary to carefully safeguard our co-operative work in 
other West Indian colonies with certain obligatory and restrictive 
conditions (and I feel that it has), I believe it more necessary to follow 
these well established lines in Porto Rim without ma ted  deviation, not 
only because of the immensity of its health problems, but also because 
of its form of government and its conflicting political factions. I have 
always felt that it was better not to do work at all than to attempt to do it 
under conditions which do not give reasonable promise of suc~ess."~' 
-Dr. Grant, anxious to begin work on malaria in Guayama, PR, wrote a 
l a t e  to Heiser in ~ u l y  of 1920 telling him that this site could produce favorable 
results, but that the government was waiting on Central Aguirre as it[Guayama] 
was surrounded by its pr~perty.'~ Howard was also anxious to begin work in 
Guayama where the RF/MB would have had support from Dr. Ruiz-Sole, then 
Commissioner of Health. He included in this proposal the stipulation that Dr. Ruiz- 
Soler would have 'nominal' supervisory power over the Aguirre project. Howard 
felt that this support would enable funding for draining which would benefit not 
only malaria control, but also "permanent drainage work such as is really necessary 
from other  standpoint^."'^ This would then meet the objectives of both 
corporations, and perhaps more importantly, government. This proposal seems to 
have been made because Howard feared too much control by Aguirre of the malaria 
control project. He even offered reasons why their financial contribution should 
not be accepted, and favored IHB covering all expenses for 192 lS4, stating that a 
" Memo from Howard to Heiser, 3118,1920. RF RG5 S1.2 B92 F1284. 
letter from Grant to Heiser, July 23, 1920. RF RGl. 1 S243H B3 F35. In a Sept. 19, 1922 
Memo, Dr. Green explains that "although the'headquarters of the Central Aguime Sugar Company 
were located at Aguirre, their properties were distributed along about 40 mdes of the coast." RF 
RG5 S2 B21 F133. 
53 Memo from Dr. Howard; Sept. 24, 1920. RF RG5 S2 B21 F132. 
54 Although Howard's reason clearly focuses on having control over the research agenda, the 
project, and its findings (RF RG5 S2 B21 F132), Green portrays RF as not wanting to accept 
money in the event the project is unsuccessful. In a September 19, 1922 memo from Dr. Green: 
"In the fall of 1919 it was decided that inasmuch malaria had never been controlled by the 
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solution for new problems in malaria control would be a "valuable contribution to 
malaria control throughout the tropics."55 
Dr. Howard is the most ubiquitous player in the relationship b;etween PR 
and RF. His proposals not only are successful above the already developing 
RFIAguirre relationship, in changing its trajectory, but also undeamines other 
critical RF officers later protests. For this reason, I believe his beliefs and goals 
were the norm for RF activities in PR. His desire to remain somewhat autonomous 
of corporate interests and his favoring of the govetnment/RF alliance reflects the 
foundation not as merely a puppet of corporations such as Aguirre, but more as 
powerful players in the health initiatives that would be carried out during this period 
in PR and other 'tropical' regions. His proposal also reflects the belief that more 
could be done with the project if not completely subjected to corporate goals. So, 
we see how through Dr. Howard the focus and goal of the project shifts from 
merely corporate alliance, to strategic political maneuvering. 
On May 18, 1922, Wycliffe Rose sends a letter to Mr. Green (the 
doctorlresearcher carrying out the project at Aguirre) protesting the costs of the 
project, suggesting not only the financial inability of Aguirre to take the work over, 
but also the relative low worth placed on the lives of Puerto Ricans. "I should be 
disposed to think that if it costs this amount to control malaria for the population 
which you have, you will find the per capita cost so high as to make it impracticable 
for the company to continue operations on this basis." He goes on to suggest 
Green prepare this figure and tells him that "If it should appear that the per capita 
cost of the control measures should go very far beyond $1, the work may be 
considered as impracticable for the corporation to continue it."56 TWO weeks later 
Green replies, suggesting that a loss to Aguirre due to malaria of over $1.00 per 
capita be demonstrated. More importantly, the notes that the Department of Health 
International Health Board in the tropics, or for that matter, by any agency in the cane lands, that 
the funds of the Central Aguirre Sugar Company could not be used to finance this work." RF 
RG5 S2 B21 F133. The importance of this twist in meaning lie in its interpretation: to interpret 
RF denial of funds for experimental work as chanty vs. the denial of funds for control over work 
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is awaiting this data to determine the feasibility of t h s  work for its own 
department.57 
The issue here is that both money and science are clearly in focus, and 
'public health', the stated goals of the RF and of the Department of Health in PR are 
no where to be found. Even more surprising is the distance Dr. Green felt for 
protecting the lives of the citizens of PR. In a 1922 letter, he discusses how 'lucky' 
another doctor was to work with a population without immunity to malaria, and 
"who were, therefore, so susceptible to malaria, that large number of deaths would 
result should they live in unprotected areas."58 In speaking abstradly of a 
vulnerable population needing medical intervention as its savior, he felt the benefits 
lie with an automatically ensured 'success' of an anti-rnalaria campaign as well as 
scientific developments to be made, rather than the costs of lives. 
This attitude towards public health, or the good of the Puerto Rican 
population are mirrored by the g a d  RF officials. Just as they had ignored the 
problems with digestive diseases and TB, they were more interested in achieving 
success in their initiatives, rather than some altruistic or humanitarian aim of aiding 
the 'progress' of health status. Howard confirms this vision in 1924 when the 
suggestion of doing a malaria survey in Ponce, the city with the highest morbidity 
in PR, is raised. He not only refuses to commit to malaria control in what he sees 
as the most difficult territory for mosquito control, but the protective stance to 
corporate interests also is reflected 
"I am fully convinced that control can only be secured by having the city 
buy all cane lands within two or three miles of the outskirts of the city 
and have cane cultivation and irrigation abandoned altogether, and do 
extensive drainage work in this area. This means the expenditure of a 
large sum. These lands could be put to no use probably but for cattle 
grazing which would b r i n ~  but small return. "..."mosquito control could 
never be a~complished."~ 
57 Ibid, May 30, 1922. 
' 9  letter from Howard to Dr. Earle, Sept. 19, 1924. RF RG5 S1.2 B 185 F2391. 
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The irony of Ponce's proximity to Guanica, whose role as the largest sugar 
. . 
cane plantation on the island and therefore of encouraging the prevalence 
and spread of malaria, cannot be missed. 
When health and life is in focus, it is relative to 'American's' [read white 
Americans, as Puerto Ricans had been granted US citizenship unda the Jones Ad 
of 19171. Wycliffe ~ o s e  felt that, based on Green's findings, it was not 
"economically feasible to control malaria."60 Dr. Green justified the project by 
pointing to the reduced cases of malaria among "Americans in Ag~irre,"~' clearly 
pointing to the lives and bodies of a population that would make the expenditure of 
money w o r t h ~ h i l e . ~ ~  What's more, the justification for this work included the 
ability to lead an even more comfortable life63 for those ['Americans'] who "have 
always lived under the best conditions, in screened houses."64 He goes on to note 
that the effect has not been the same among  laborer^,^' but does not incorporate a 
fact he mentions later, that "Only a very small percentage of the total population in 
this area live in screened houses. "66 
His reasons why the results had not been as successful as for 'white' 
Americans, dealt with the increased cost of control work due to the strike6' going 
. 60 Memo from Rose to Green on Oct. 18, 1922. RF5 S1.2 B 132 F 1762. Specifically, Rose was 
tallang about Green's method of reducing mosquito breeding as not economically efficient. ?his 
same method was used, however, in later initiatives. What's more, it was increased production 
that had indirectly increased the breeding of the mosquito, so to have used thrs method instead of 
. treatment of individual patients with quanine seems dot like it would have called Central Aguirre 
to have taken responsibility for the environmental h d s  to health they had created... 
Ibid. Letter from Green to Rose, Feb. 14, 1923. 
62 Green's final report in 1923 showed that the per capita cost was $4.37. RF RG5 S2 B21 F131. 
63 i.e. discard "their mosquito nets so that instead of being better protected they had less mechanical 
protection." 1923 Final Report; RF RG5 S2 B21 F131. 
64 letter from Green to Rose on Feb. 14,1923. RF RG5 S1.2 B 156 F2046. 
65 Ibid. 
66 1923 Final Report; RF RG5 S2 B2 1 F 131. 
67 His 1923 report shows he had no idea what the strike was for, but stdl felt legitimate in 
reporting about it. He writes "On Januaq 15th, nearly all of the laborers working in the cane 
fields in the Aguirre unit struck for more money and fewer hours, or somethng of the kind." RF 
RG5 S2 B21 F131. 
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strongly in PR at that time. As a result of the stnke, people refused to cut cane and 
those that did were being watched by the special police.68 Fourty-four had been 
shot and three killed had been from that region. In discussing the strike, race is not 
absent from the concept of 'American' and worthiness of life, as he makes clear that 
"All of the men have been shot in the back which is characteristic of these 
people. *69 
Despite the fact that Green reports "an increase in the amount of malaria in 
the two years [I921 and 19231" and that ''The density of Anopheles mosquitoes in 
other sections has increased during the same periodn7' the RF in 1924 begins a 
similar demonstration project in malaria control in Fajardo. The initiative not only 
attempted to control mosquito breeding, but also administered quinine to patients. 
This project, unllke that at Aguirre, involved cooperation with several 
corporate, private, and government interests. The project began in Fajardo, home 
of the Fajardo sugar company, with the company paying a large part of the 
expenses for draining of swamps and work in the cane fields. Dr. Earle headed the 
project in PR and his summary in 1926 noted that the town of Fajardo and p r o m  
Although I was not able to find more infognation about this strike at the time of writing thls 
paper, it seems to have coerced labor, at l e t  at Aguirre. Green writes "In fact there was an excess 
of labor in spite of the strike. l lus resulted in establishing a sort of warfare waged by the agents 
of the strike leaders upon the laborers who were at work in the cane fields. l lus condition made it 
dangerous for oilers and inspectors to work in the cane fields. The danger was greatly increased due 
to' the fact that the belligerent forces were composed of non-workers employed for the purpose of 
shooting and in other ways intimidating the men at work in the cane fields. These gun-men were 
not acquainted with the oilers and inspectors working in the cane fields and therefore, although the 
"mosquito-men were respected by both the strikers and the workers, they had no protection from 
the real sources of danger. Oilers were working in adjacent cane fields on two occasions when 
shots were fired at the cane cutters. 
"Shortly after this time special police were employed to protect the cane cutters while at 
work in the fields. These police were also a source of danger to the oilers as they were not 
acquainted with the oilers and had recieved orders to shoot anyone entering or leaving the cane 
fields near the workers." RF RG5 ~2 B2 1 F 13 1: 
The sensitivity to a turbulent political situation is raised repeatedly even in this period. 
The RF could have taken a more pro-active stance, even in claiming safety for themselves from 
indiscriininate shooting. There is no data to suggest however, that RF ever opposed any use of 
violence on local or state levels. 
69 Ibid. 
'O 1923 Final Report; RF RG5 S 2  B2 1 F 13 1. 
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owners were other financial contributors. The project was also the result of 
political and financial cooperation with the Insular Department of Health. 
The same patterns occur in this initiative as the previous one. Sugar 
production is still central,71 as are concerns over the development of corporate 
interests on the island.72 This particular initiative, however, sheds better light on 
underlying issues surrounding status, authority, and legitimacy. This theme 
extends into frustrations surrounding mdcal  knowledge, and racialized 
understanding of Puerto Rican doctors as inferior. 
In a July, 1920 letter from Dr. Grant to Dr. Heiser, his discussion of a lack 
of overall statistical knowledge demonstrates not only his unfamiliarity with other 
diseases stressing the Puerto Rican population, but also reflects the general lack of 
education and the small level of decision making power doctors in the field had in 
comparison to those at the RF/IHB. Similarly, Dr. Earle approaches the same 
question early in his involvement in this initiative, only he does have knowledge of 
the statistics on TB. Dr. Earle, however, does not trust these figures either because 
of the alarm they cause in the papers for the "supposed increase in these diseases" 
or because "a few cases of malaria are reported now and then"73 and he has an 
investment in making this seem a pressing problem than in perhaps really is.74 
7'  Letter from Earle to Howard, Sept. 8, 1924. "It is interesting to note that the soils are known 
to be more acid in Fajardo for large amounts of lime are needed to increase the crop of cane." RF 
RG5 S1.2 B185,F2391. 
72 Letter from Earle to Howard, Sept. 8, 1924. "A central like that at Fajardo with a payroll of 
some 2000 or more and a population in its colonies of much greater size would be richly repaid by 
the services of a full time health officer to study their problems. The opportunities for work for 
one in such a position would be unlimited." RF RG5 S 1.2 B 185 F2391. 
73 Letter from Earle to Howard, Sept.8, 1924. RF RG5 S1.2 B185 F2391; - .  
74 In fact, Earle had also felt that malaria was underreported. See his letter to Howard on June 20, 
1925. RF RG5 S 1.2 B217 F2769. He also felt that many cases of malaria were being conflated 
with digestive diseases, and called 'gastroenteritis'. See brs Oct. 28, 1925 letter to Howard. RF 
RG5 S 1.2 B2-17 F2770. Finally, he suggests an avenue for further research.. He suggests in his 
1925 report on malaria surveys in PR that Dr. Grant "thought he noticed a relation between 
mortality rates and the economic conditions of the Island. For instance, those yea& when salaries 
were high and the budgets large showed lower mortahty rates." RF RG5 S2 B21 F133. Reprinted 
in Pono Rico Health Review. vol.l:4, October 1925. pgs. 12-18. I'm inclined to think high 
. salaries relates to better nutrition and increased living standards in general, butit suggests that 
some type of spurious relationshp may exist in reporting mortality, and perhaps morbidity. 
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It is in t h s  affiliation between the ~nsular Department of Health and the RF 
that health as a tool of the colonizer is suggested. In a letter from the governor, 
Gov. Towner suggests their work is effective because of their tact. His next 
sentence suggests what exactly about this work is effective, i.e. public appreciation 
of foreign intervention through health, that is because RF is "making it understood 
and appreciated by the people.n7s This is obviously also a concern of the RF, who 
wants to maintain its alliance with government. In a 1924 letter to Dr. Earle, 
Howard tells him "We must not underestimated the effect of public opinion 
properly diverted. If we "selln public health work to the people of Porto Rico they 
wdl take care of the policies of Dodor or ti^."^^ 
Again, the RF was not merely a puppet of political interests. Howard's 
action to refuse financial cooperation from Aguirre, and the benefits to the RF of 
favoring its alliance with government becomes clearer in 1924. In Earle's letter to 
Howard, he discusses how "It would mtainly be much better if a more efficient 
local health department could be developed on the plan of county health departments 
in which the malaria problem would receive the major attenti~n."~~ The RF thus 
strategically creates its political position as a powerful player in the agenda setting 
of health initiatives for the government. This affected the health initiatives that 
would be carried out during this period in PR as well as other 'tropical' regions. 
RF influence was not only limited to the public health agenda, however, but 
it also affected the selection of doctors, physicians, and engineers that were in RF 
favor. It seems clear that continued involvement of RF in the public health of PR 
depended on many conditions favorable to their 'success' as defined above, and 
they would threaten to withdraw support if their political desires were unmet. 
Howard writes that unless the Department of Health is earnestly concerned with 
malaria, "and unless this earnestness is shown by the early appointment of an 
engineer and physician, the best that can be secured, I shall most certainly 
recommend to our Board that malaria activities be discontinued when the survey is 
76 letter from Howard to Dr. Earle, Sept. 19, 1924. RF RG5 S1.2 B 185 F2391. 
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ended.n78 Completely absent from this is their stated goal of "The Welfare of 
Mankind Throughout the World." 
There are two forces at work in the position of Puerto Rican doctor's status. 
First, on a historical level this lack of medical advancement tied into a distrust of 
medical practice in general.79 Dr. Grant's letter tells us the salary of another field 
doctor in the uncinariasis campaign, $100,8° paralleling literature discussing the 
relative lack of status, authority, and the low pay during this period in medicine's 
history. This phenomenon provides insight into the difficulty of carrying out 
initiatives with high turnover rate among doctors and personnel in general. 
Second, the ethnocentrism and racism of Rockefeller doctors directly 
affected the way they understood the work Puerto Rican doctors were doing, the 
relative worth of this work, and any possibilities for collaboration. As doctors, any 
possible status did not exempt them from prevalent stereotypes of Puerto Ricans as 
lazy. In a letter from Howard to Dr. Hill who worked with anemia, for example, 
he tells him that work with him and Earle was not popular among Puerto Rican 
doctors because "when they come out on your post for duty they a;.e expected to do 
something, and under ordinary circumstances they would do very little. They are 
not pleased with the assignment to do the anaemia or hookworm campaign nor the 
malaria survey work evidently."" The belief that Puerto Ricans lack a work ethic 
extends into the way they perceive the involvement in politics and government 
where "they do only as much as they please."82 
It seems obvious from boxes of data on fellowships that in judgments about 
what qualifies an 'adequate candidates' RF personnel see service to the sick poor as 
Letter from Howard to Rolla B. Hill, Feb. 7, 1925. RF RG5 S1.2 B217 F2775. 
7 9  Duffy, Brown. 
as compared to the salary of RF doctors for that time, wh~ch ranged from $2,000 to $4,000. 
letter from Howard to Hill, Feb.7, 1925. RF RG5 S1.2 B217 F2775. He says later in the 
same letter, "The-truth of the matter is that everywhere you see this apathy and unconcern about 
malaria control among the average public health workers, because most of them know but little 
about malana except that they have observed that malaria control means hard work which for some 
reason does not seem to appeal to them" 
a letter from Howard to Hill, Feb.7, 1925. RF RG5 S1.2 8217 F2775. 
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inferior work. There are two types of doctors; Dr. Ruiz-Soler as Commissioner of 
Health, and others such as Dr. Fernos who succeeds him, who enjoy some level of 
respect from RF doctors, and 'the rest', those being municipal doctors. The status 
these doctors lacked was particularly important in the light that any 
recommendations to the government resulting from the initiatives which they were 
involved in would go through R F . ~ ~  It is also part~cularly important because there 
was a strict code of conduct, which although unspoken, nevertheless meant lost 
financial and educational opportunities for Puerto Ricans who dared to have any 
independent aspirations that differed from those the RF had graced them withs4. In 
a 1924 plan to reorganize the medical department, these attitudes become 
increasingly clear, as does the relative worth of their work in his eyes. 
In two letters Earle writes to Howard, he demonstrates both his paternalistic 
idea of Puerto Rican doctors, and the value of the work. In the second, he 
discusses a young doctor who is more interested in anemia work than malaria, and 
wouldn't collect some types of data because he felt it was a job for inspectors. he 
writes that this doctor "feels a little too much his own importance and I believe if he 
gets a few bumps he will learn a great deal.n85 Even in regards to the more 
'respectable' and politically powerful doctors, he dismisses their work. he writes, 
"I cannot help but feel that with the removal of the burden of 90% of hookworm 
disease and 30-40% malaria, and with intelligent efforts directed at tuberculosis and 
other transmissible diseases there would be no work for a large number of these 
municipal doctors. Possibly Dr. W. realizes this and if given direction of the 
activities of these doctors he may get more razl public health work done [emphasis 
mine]. *86 
His quote not only fluminates the status of non-legitimatedlrelatively 
powerless .he r to  Rican physicians, but also a different definition of public health. 
Based on this statement, public health work is not work for the majority of the 
83 RF RG5 S1.2 B185 F2391. 
84 In a Dec. 11, 1924 letter, Howard tells Earle that although the doctor he spoke of may have been 
capable, he was unlikely to get a fellowshp from RF because had not taken the opportunity to 
work on malaria in Aguadilla. RF RG5 S 1.2 B 185 F2391. (see footnote below) 
Nov. 28, 1924 letter from Earle to Howard. RF RG5 S1.2 B185 F2391. 
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public which is 'poor', nor dealing with epidemic proportions of communicable 
diseases such as TB. Instead, the ''real public health work* seem to lie in the realm 
of research and politics. In fact, the public health was developing by leaps and 
bounds and more effective treatments and causes of disease were being found. 
Malaria was in very low concentration in the interior rural areas of the island 
because the mosquitoes can't live in higher altitudes and mountain regions. The 
racially white 'jibaro' lives in these regions, where blacks and mulattos were more 
often located in coastal areas. It was in these coastal areas that malaria, when 
found, was concentrated A geographic predisposition, however, and a socially 
constructed concept of either biological weakness or disease carrier among blacks 
and mulattos represents two v q  different conceptions of race in Puerto Rico. 
A survey was also made of Salinas for future work as "one of the regions 
most severely attacked by malariana7, and Humacao in 1925. In '26, this work was 
extended to Yauco, Guayama, Santa Isabel and Luquillo. The infection rates were 
studied from the standpoint of race, and a 1926 report states that "a definite 
tendency for a higher parasite rate in the negrosn existed. The discourse on 
racialized groups as diseased and contaminating other, as well as the biologization 
of race becomes especially apparent here, when he notes that ''race may be one of 
the factors at work in musing a relatively high pamite mte[ernphasis mine] in Porto 
Ricon even though he notes that the 'spleen rate', which when larger indicate 
malaria infection, "was almost the same as in whites*", and only 1/10 of his 
sample was classed as 'negro'. 
These studies clarify that the laboring class of sugar cane workers was not 
only understood as ethnically distinct from the white American RF doctors, but also 
racially variable. Race formed a central discourse for Rockefeller doctors to 
understand ths  class of workers, and informed a concept of what 'minority' canied 
malaria, potentially 'infecting' other [white and mulatto] workers, and would thus 
have to be controlled or eliminated The con flation of the negro with the parasite in 
87 In 1926 Preliminary Annual Report, 1926 summary, "Demonstration in Malaria Control at 
Fajardo, Porto Rico" by Dr. W. C. Earle to Mr. Howard. RF RG5 S3.243H B72. 
From Report of Bureau of Malaria Control, 1926-27. RF RG5 S3.2431874. Quotes taken 
from pg.2 1 .  
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the above quote clearly demonstrates the latent meanings of disease and 'malarja 
control '. 
Ponce which has been repeatedly mentioned throughout the paper and in the 
documents presents one such case. While the city is close to the largest sugar 
central on the island, there are many ways to think about malaria control within the 
city. At times, the RF takes some responsibility and admits _the case seems 
daunting. Often, it is blamed on the political officials within Ponce which change 
often, or are apathetic to sanitation. More often, it is blamed on the stubborn 
residents of Ponce who won't leave or move. Some documents talk about how 
malaria develops in the water under houses. The Rockefeller Foundation, 
however, focuses on controlling population as its only feasible solution. They in 
fact say in many different ways and instances that "malaria control cannot be 
attempted in such a region without some control over the population and without 
some control over water."89 Whether it be through social construction of lazy 
Puerto Ricans who lack a work ethic and civil spirit, duty Puerto Ricans who don't 
know what's good for them, implicating their ignorance, or the general paternalistic 
attitude and conditional involvement within a self-interested initiatives, the 
Rockefeller Foundation did not, in fad, live up to their goal of 'The Welfare of 
Mankind Throughout the World." 
Conclusion 
It seems clear that the way the Rockefeller Foundation defined public health 
was not in terms of their stated goals, "The Welfare of Mankind Throughout the 
World", but rather in terms of their definitions of research and outcome success. 
This meant that projects that were not understood as having a high likelihood for 
success were bypassed from the outset. The reasons stated by Howard for not 
pursuing a malaria control of Ponce, before the survey was even begun, provides 
evidence of the goals of the RF in PR. 
. - 
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Yet,.malaria did decrease in Puerto ~ i c o  but less so than other diseases. 
The political situation of PR drectly affeded the health status of its citizens, as did 
capitalist development. The effect RF had in terms of intervention merely slowed 
the process of infection and spread, but didn't effectively change the trend. 
Epidemics, especially TB, continued unchecked and unabated by the financially and 
politically powerful RF. The findings of this study clearly identify the specific 
character of thier initiatives which both ignored the severest health problems, as 
well as those causing them. That their initiatives were linked to sugar interests, and 
that they played a role in setting the government's public health agenda, provide 
clues as to how health care andhealth status would develop in PR's history. 
The inextricable alliances of the RF with corporate interests and government 
policy also are clearly outlined from both malaria initiatives pursued in the 1920's. 
On one hand. they wanted the involvement of corporations to finance these 
initiatives. On the other, they were unwilling to sacrifice the power and role they 
would enjoy on setting the Department of Health's public health's agenda. This 
study complicates a simple understanding of health status as a simple reflection of 
corporate interests to maintain a healthy work force by providing an understanding 
of the political interests of RF and the government-at work. 
Finally, this study provides preliminary evidence of how health played a 
role in securing some public support in favor of the colonial administration. In its 
analysis of discourse, it points to the political desires of both capitalist exploitation 
and poltical desires to maintain PR as a colony. The findings also reflect that race 
and understandings of a bio-cultural vulnerability not only served to legitimate 
intervention in lives, both through health initiatives and colonial administration, but 
to the very definition of the labor force and those that were included in RF narrow 
efforts. 
Directions for Further Research 
There are multiple avenues I would like to pursue directly related to this 
analysis, and in future work. Chief among these concerns is a development of my 
analysis of the discourse on Puerto Rico as a diseased nation. This will accomplish 
two different objectives. First, it will allow me to integrate work on other countries 
that emphasizes military health. Second, it will allow me to understand how the 
. . 
Conrrolling Malaria and Men Page 30 
colonizer perceived work and life in PR. Whereas in many other studles on 
colonialism and disease the colonizer moved to the colony and thus stimulated 
public health work to protect their health, this does not seem to be the case in PR. 
This focus will enable me to contextualize Dr. Walter C. Earle's statements: "I 
seem to be gradually picking up all the dlseases they have in Porto Rico and 
mention dengue as the latest." "I wonder what else they have in Ponce besides 
dengue, typhoid, and 
This study also requires a more comparative analysis on coastal health and 
rural health. Rural health is obviously ignored, and the majority of the Puerto 
&can population at this time lives in rural areas. Perhaps a preliminary . . analysis on 
the anemia/uncinariasis/hookwm campaign would help N1 in alot of the gaps in 
this study. 
I would also like to explore the relationship between health and migration. 
This relationship is suggested through the data where doctors construct malaria as a 
problem to either a) move people out of Ponce, a geographically advantageous 
location for military, economic, and political initiatives or b) to prevent Puerto 
Ricans for reaping any benefits of 'development'. For example: 
"This particular doctor is interested because he and several others bought 
water and light and are trying to get the people to move up. Another group 
has bought some of the cane fields and are preparing to sell lots there. 
Unfortunately more land is being bought for these subdivisions in the part 
bordering the cane fields. It will mean that much more cane field to buy later 
on. I told Dr. Ortiz about it in the hope that the might stop further building in 
the malarious district but I guess he won't do anything about it."91 
For future work, I would like io supplement this data and understand alot of 
issues that the documents briefly mention ih passing. Chief among these concerns 
are those related to public opinion. Dr. Ruiz-Soler's 1919 Report to The Governor 
suggests that there was some public protest of health interventions. He writes: 
"Public opinion has not always been unanimous in accepting catain sanitary 
measures." I would also like to investigate the which were made against the RF's 
campaigns by physicians which are multiply present even h thls small sample of 
data. 
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